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8.1  The Vision for APEC 
At Bogor, Indonesia, in November 1994, the leaders of the Asia Pacific Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  (APEC) forum declared their commitment to “free and 
open trade in the region” and set a target date for its realization. At the ministe- 
rial meeting in Jakarta a number of facilitation and cooperation programs were 
reviewed. Many observers have noted that APEC has already moved down the 
road toward institutionalization. They do not seem to share a clear vision of 
APEC as a regional integration, however. The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) 
has outlined its views on APEC, and APEC leaders, both at Seattle in 1993 and 
at Bogor in  1994, seem to have endorsed the general direction set forth by the 
EPG (APEC 1993). At Seattle the leaders envisioned APEC as “a community 
of Asia Pacific economies,” and at Bogor they set as its agenda “a balanced 
package  of  trade  liberalization, facilitation,  and  development cooperation” 
(APEC 1995d). The first task of those shaping the agenda for the APEC lead- 
er’s meeting in Osaka, then, was to identify a clear vision of regional integra- 
tion for APEC. 
The absence of a clear common vision has prompted some typical criticisms 
of APEC. Some argue that APEC will be ineffective because of the diversity 
among its members. Others argue that East Asia would continue its rapid eco- 
nomic development even without an institution like APEC. Finally, some crit- 
ics complain that nothing concrete was decided at Bogor. 
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also worked on APEC in association with the PECC Trade Policy Forum, a tripartite organization 
of businesspeople, academics, and government officials seeking regional consensus on economic 
cooperation issues. Sections 8.3-8.5  of  this paper are based on his study in collaboration with his 
PECC colleagues, Andrew Elek and Hadi Seosastro. Sections 8.7 and 8.8 were added after the 
APEC Osaka meeting. 
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All of these criticisms are based on an EC- or NAFTA-type model. There is 
an  alternative, however-a  more flexible regional forum than the European 
Community and NAFTA. I call this model the “open economic association” 
(OEA).’ An  OEA is (1) open in that its structure and policies do not lead to 
discrimination against the rest of the world in trade and investment, (2) eco- 
nomic in its primary policy focus, and (3) a voluntary association in that its 
members do not cede sovereignty to any supranational regional institution. 
Recognizing the increasingly sophisticated nature of international economic 
transactions, the scope of an OEA goes well beyond that of a traditional FTA. 
The tempo of trade liberalization may be less rapid than in traditional FTAs, 
but liberalization is applied to both members and nonmembers on a most- 
favored-nation basis, and the gradual liberalization of trade in goods and ser- 
vices is supplemented by facilitation in dismantling all impediments to all in- 
ternational economic transactions, as well as development cooperation. This 
balanced program can address vast differences in stages of development, cur- 
rent levels of  impediments to trade and investment, and preparedness for re- 
form among association members. 
The highly interdependent, private-sector-driven growth of the Asia Pacific 
economies has been generated by  active trade and investment in spite of  re- 
maining tariffs and nontariff barriers (NTBs). It is not necessary to further 
strengthen this market-driven integration but would be sufficient to have grad- 
ual trade liberalization, facilitating trade and investment and economic cooper- 
ation in order to create steady trade and investment expansion in the region. 
With this realistic concept of an OEA in hand, we can refute the criticisms 
of APEC noted above. First, an OEA is feasible within the vast diversity of the 
Asia Pacific region. Second, an OEA would enable continuation of the current 
1. The term “open economic association” may not be widespread and may need further explana- 
tion. The author proposed the term for the first time in a journal article in 1992 (Yamazawa 1992) 
on the grounds that the conventional concept of free trade area (FTA) does not conform to the 
reality of the Asia Pacific region and a better concept should be invented. He elaborated this con- 
cept in Yamazawa (1993). 
The framework within which regional integration is normally analyzed is derived from the five 
developmental stages proposed by Balassa (1961). They are free trade area (FTA), customs union, 
common market, economic union, and complete economic union, with development taking place 
in this order. Balassa’s typology was developed by  focusing on the elimination of discriminatory 
practices within a particular region. Two problems arise when we apply the Balassa typology to 
the Asia Pacific region. First, the earliest stage of integration (FTA) is usually accompanied by 
discrimination against nonmembers, but APEC does not intend to discriminate against nonmem- 
bers under “open regionalism.” Second, none of Balassa’s five stages capture APEC’s new type of 
integration, supplementing liberalization with facilitation and cooperation programs in its earli- 
est stage. 
Balassa himself acknowledged the potential for international economic cooperation of various 
kinds, extending beyond the simple elimination of  discriminatory practices. The EC Common 
Agricultural Policy has been in place since 1967, while cooperation in the steel and energy indus- 
tries has been a feature of European life since before the founding of the Community itself. The 
cause of regional integration calls not only for the abolition of discriminatory practices but also 
for a large measure of policy and institutional cooperation and coordination. There has been a fair 
degree of success in policy coordination and economic cooperation among members of regional 
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high growth rates of the region. Finally, at Bogor, APEC leaders did, in fact, 
commit  themselves  to  an  Asia  Pacific  OEA. The  Osaka  agenda  aims  to 
strengthen this vision of an Asia Pacific OEA. 
This is APEC’s vision of “a community of Asia Pacific economies.” If coun- 
tries share the objective of sustaining regional growth and cooperate with each 
other toward that goal, the region will be worthy of  the title “community.” 
There is already an evolving sense of  community in the Asia Pacific region. 
This feeling of  community can enhance the certainty and stability of the re- 
gion, thereby attracting the private enterprises of members and nonmembers 
alike. 
8.2  A Balanced Package Proposal 
The main aim of the Osaka agenda was to provide a feasible long-term pro- 
gram for implementing an Asia Pacific OEA. The Bogor declaration identified 
three elements of regional integration-trade  liberalization, trade facilitation, 
and development cooperation-and  APEC leaders at Osaka committed their 
support to all three in a balanced package (APEC 1995b). 
These three elements are interdependent; in particular, trade liberalization 
cannot be effectively implemented without the other two. First of all, the de- 
marcation between trade liberalization and facilitation is not clear. At Jakarta, 
ministers adopted the nonbinding investment principle, which has often been 
classified as a facilitation program but is actually a liberalization of  foreign 
investment. Harmonization  of  rules,  standards, and  import  procedures are 
necessary before trade liberalization can be effectively implemented. Other 
facilitation programs recommended in the EPG report, including dispute medi- 
ation services and consultation on macroeconomic, environmental, and com- 
petition policies, all supplement the effective implementation of trade liberal- 
ization. 
The third element of APEC mentioned in the Bogor declaration, develop- 
ment cooperation, reflects the unique characteristics of the APEC membership. 
There are vast difference among members in stage of  development, level of 
technology, and managerial and administrative capability. It is important to 
implement cooperation measures to fill these gaps, such as training customs 
officials, transferring advanced quarantine and testing technology, and so on. 
Development cooperation could go beyond those programs directly related to 
trade liberalization and facilitation to include measures relating to infrastruc- 
ture, human resources, and entrepreneurship. 
Thus, trade facilitation and development cooperation support trade liberal- 
ization. But how  can trade liberalization help trade facilitation and develop- 
ment cooperation? Trade liberalization provides a driving force for prompt and 
steady progress of the other two elements. Facilitation and development coop- 
eration often fail to attract sufficient attention from the public and the media 
and tend to lose momentum as the result of various technical and administra- 
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The liberalization and facilitation agenda of APEC will be adopted by con- 
sensus, not through negotiations of  GATT or FTA  type, and implemented by 
the coordinated decisions of individual participants. Individual APEC govern- 
ments will announce their own liberalization and facilitation programs volun- 
tarily, on the basis of which a common guideline for APEC cooperation will be 
produced and adopted by consensus. Individual members will then implement 
policies according to their own domestic legislative processes. Unilateral ef- 
forts will be concerted through consultation within APEC, and actual imple- 
mentation will be monitored and reviewed jointly so that unilateral efforts are 
encouraged. 
8.3  Consistency with Multilateral Liberalization 
Regional integration has often been criticized in the past as inconsistent with 
multilateral liberalization. But it has now become almost a consensus view that 
regional integration and multilateral liberalization can be, and in many respects 
actually are, consistent. The recent report of  the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD 1995) surveyed existing regional inte- 
grations such as the European Community, EFTA, and NAFTA and came to an 
interesting conclusion. That is, some aspects of regional integration, such as 
preferential tariff reductions and strict rules of origin, by their nature discrimi- 
nate against nonmembers and indeed are contradictory to multilateral liberal- 
ization. However, these regional integrations have also implemented measures 
in such areas as harmonization of rules and standards, investment principles, 
trade in services policy, intellectual property rights, environmental protection, 
and industrial cooperation. These measures do not discriminate against others 
but serve as a laboratory, a halfway station in the effort to move from separate 
national standards to a single multilateral standard. APEC can focus on the 
nondiscriminatory aspects of regional integration and avoid those components 
that discriminate against nonmembers. 
Because of their high dependence on trade and investment links beyond the 
region, Asia Pacific economies have shown great interest in global trade liber- 
alization and have participated actively in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
APEC trade ministers could confirm their Uruguay Round agreements, reaf- 
firm the “standstill” of their current restrictions, complete remaining negotia- 
tions in services, and accelerate the Uruguay Round liberalizations in a few 
significant areas. Coordinated action by  APEC governments would enhance 
their collective capacity to promote global liberalization. 
The areas of  accelerated or additional liberalization, beyond the minimum 
requirements of  the Uruguay Round, will be governed by  Article  1 of  the 
GATT, and concerted unilateral liberalization by  individual governments will 
be extended to members and nonmembers alike on a most-favored-nation ba- 
sis. The implementation of the advanced liberalization package will be moni- 
tored and reviewed jointly to assure the continued attention of  all members 
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A fourth criticism of APEC is that the process of trade liberalization within 
the group is so slow that it will be buried under the progress of multilateral 
liberalization centered around the new  World Trade Organization (WTO). 
However, all cautious observers realize that multilateral liberalization will not 
move forward unless certain key players work together. The APEC group, to- 
gether with the European Community, is supposed to be a prime mover. 
APEC governments can talk to EU governments and others and encourage 
them to join in a similar accelerated implementation of the Uruguay Round 
outcomes. At a later stage, they could invite the Union to initiate, jointly with 
APEC, a new round of global liberalization within the WTO. 
The interaction between APEC and the European Community will be criti- 
cal to this process. Unlike the Community, APEC does not aim to establish a 
formal supranational body but will instead remain a more flexible OEA for the 
next quarter-century. However, because its members include major economic 
powers and fast-growing newly industrialized economies, APEC will likely 
interact closely with EC members to build the WTO. The new WTO regime 
will certainly be affected by  the liberalization program APEC adopts. Some 
suggest that APEC should threaten the European Community with discrimina- 
tory  liberalization unless the Community accepts similar liberalization. But 
such a tit-for-tat approach may make the Community inward looking and may 
split the world economy into two groups. APEC, with its slogan of “open re- 
gionalism,’’ can instead encourage the Community to keep an outward-looking 
stance and promote mutual participation in each other’s development. APEC 
representatives will also cooperate to complete negotiations for the entry of 
non-WTO members of APEC into the WTO and to integrate the proposed lib- 
eralization efforts into a truly APEC-wide undertaking. 
8.4  A Feasible Liberalization Program 
The Bogor declaration committed APEC leaders to trade and investment 
liberalization within APEC. However, details of implementation were left to 
ministers and senior officials, and they composed a major part of  the Osaka 
agenda. The second EPG report did not articulate the modality and scope of 
APEC liberalization but only suggested that it should be up to individual mem- 
bers whether to apply the liberalization achieved within APEC to nonmembers 
on an unconditional most-favored-nation basis or on a reciprocal FTA  basis 
(APEC 1994). 
Let me articulate a feasible program for APEC liberalization consistent with 
the WTO regime.* First, “free and open trade in the area” by  2020 means the 
elimination of all tariffs and NTBs and is intended to cover virtually the same 
sectors as the WTO. APEC’s long-term implementation program will provide 
a clear idea of the path for the elimination of tariffs and NTBs by 2020. 
2. The author is indebted Andrew Elek and Hadi Seosastro, with whom he developed the ideas 
in the following two sections through their joint drafting of PECC (1995). 208  Ippei Yamazawa 
A straightforward method would be a gradual across-the-board reduction of 
tariffs down to virtually zero, starting in  1996 and ending in 2010 for devel- 
oped APEC countries and in 2020 for the rest of APEC. However, this was not 
feasible before the Osaka meeting for the following reasons. 
First, all members agree that APEC liberalization must be WTO-consistent. 
The WTO is brand new, and it is thought important to see whether its liberal- 
ization program, including farm products and textiles, will be implemented on 
schedule. Furthermore, the negotiation of  some services was  not completed 
under the GATT and must be continued under the WTO. It is thus not likely 
that APEC negotiators will start another round of across-the-board liberaliza- 
tion beyond the Uruguay Round agreements. 
Second, APEC will have to settle the philosophical debate over uncondi- 
tional most-favored-nation versus reciprocal FTA liberalization if  it wishes to 
keep its across-the-board liberalization consistent with the GATTNTO. The 
second EPG report left this question to individual countries. If an APEC mem- 
ber applies APEC liberalization on an unconditional most-favored-nation basis 
(which is the same as unilateral liberalization to nonmembers), it will be quite 
consistent with Article 1 of the GATT. But if an APEC member offers liberal- 
ized trade to nonmembers on a reciprocal basis, it is unclear whether this sort 
of preferential trading arrangement is permitted under GATT Article 24 unless 
all APEC partners enter into formal and binding  agreement^.^ 
Third, it is relatively easy to envision a gradual reduction of  tariffs, but 
NTBs are more problematic. Tariffs have become less important in developed 
countries and newly industrialized economies, which must now turn their at- 
tention to reducing NTBs, especially in services, intellectual property rights, 
and investment rules. 
Fourth, the negotiation of China’s entry into the WTO has not yet been con- 
cluded, and without China and Chinese Taipei in the WTO, APEC’s liberaliza- 
tion agenda will be incomplete. 
It will take some years to monitor the implementation of the WTO liberaliza- 
tion, to promote services negotiation, to elaborate the modality of eliminating 
NTBs, and to achieve full WTO membership of all APEC members. 
An  alternative to across-the-board liberalization is sectoral liberalization. 
Sectoral liberalization within APEC could be conducted as an extension of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations in order to realize certain achievement in advance 
of multilateral liberalization under the WTO. It will not be easy for each mem- 
ber to draw up a complete across-the-board liberalization program in the first 
year of implementing the Uruguay Round liberalizations and announcing their 
accelerated schedule. But APEC members may be able to go beyond the Uru- 
guay Round agreements in some well-prepared sectors and to implement in 
advance some areas to be completed in the continuing services negotiations. 
Individual members can announce their APEC liberalization programs volun- 
3. See Yarnazawa (1994) for a comparison of  the two approaches. 209  Recent Developments of APEC 
tarily and implement them unilaterally on a most-favored-nation basis, consis- 
tent with GATT/WTO rules. 
In this process, individual APEC members will be encouraged by unilateral 
offers of fellow APEC members, and these liberalization offers will be summa- 
rized by the Committee on Trade and Investment in an APEC package of uni- 
lateral liberalization that goes beyond the Uruguay Round agreements. This 
package will be combined with APEC guidelines for consensus. Individual 
APEC members shall implement their liberalization offers according to these 
APEC guidelines, and implementation will be monitored and reviewed jointly. 
A sequence of sectoral liberalizations, starting with easy areas and moving 
on to more difficult areas, is certainly a pragmatic approach. However, this 
method may not provide an overall perspective of the entire process until 2020. 
A possible solution would be a combination of the two modalities in sequence; 
that is, start with the liberalization of easier sectors for some number of years, 
but switch to across-the-board liberalization at a later date, say 2000. 
While the Uruguay Round commitments are implemented on schedule, or 
ahead of schedule, additional unilateral liberalization by  individual members 
will be a pragmatic way  of maintaining the momentum toward free and open 
trade. By no later than 2000 for developed countries and 2005 for other partici- 
pants, the completion of the Uruguay Round liberalization will be assured and 
substantial additional unilateral APEC liberalization will have  accumulated. 
By that time, APEC members will be in a position to review the process and 
draw up an across-the-board program so that the liberalization commitment by 
APEC leaders can be fulfilled no later than 2010 and 2020. 
Thus, a feasible program for APEC liberalization can be summarized as 
follows: 
1.  APEC governments reaffirm their standstill commitments. 
2.  Each government sets out schedules for 
a. meeting its obligations under the Uruguay Round, 
b.  accelerating its Uruguay Round liberalization, and 
c.  extending beyond its Uruguay Round commitments. 
The  combination of  these unilateral  commitments would  form  the  initial 
schedule of “concerted unilateral liberalization.” 
3. APEC governments commit to the monitoring and review of progress of the 
trade liberalization mentioned above. 
4. By no later than 2000 for developed members and 2005 for other members, 
APEC governments review progress and draw up an across-the-board liber- 
alization program to meet the 2010 and 2020 targets. 
In all these stages, APEC would talk to the European Union and others and 
encourage them to make similar liberalization efforts to that serious free-rider 
problems could be avoided. This would be especially important in  stage 4, 
when APEC proposes to take joint initiative for new WTO liberalization. 210  Ippei Yamazawa 
The approach outlined above may be regarded as too slow. However, even 
under existing tariffs and NTBs, trade and investment have expanded rapidly 
enough for Asia Pacific economies to have achieved high growth rates over the 
past decade. Slow but steady liberalization will guarantee the certainty and 
credibility of Asia Pacific markets and factories and will attract business from 
members and nonmembers alike. 
8.5  Facilitation of Trade and Investment 
The scope of the Bogor undertakings needs to be interpreted broadly. Tradi- 
tional trade barriers, such as tariffs or quotas, are no longer the only strategic 
obstacles to the mutually beneficial integration of the Asia Pacific region. The 
reduction of these barriers needs to be accompanied by work to reduce transac- 
tion costs imposed by uncertainties and wide divergences in domestic regula- 
tions and administrative  procedures that affect the ease or cost of trade, invest- 
ment, and other economic transactions among APEC economies. 
Accordingly, APEC governments will need to address, comprehensively, the 
full range of  impediments to such transactions, including (1) deficiencies in 
information about regional markets and policies and (2) policy-based impedi- 
ments, such as barriers to transactions applied at borders, divergences in do- 
mestic policies influencing economic transactions, and uncertainties due to 
lack of transparency or arbitrary application of policy. 
There are some useful lessons to be learned from the EU experience. The 
European Union eliminated internal tariffs in the 1960s, but it was not until it 
tackled a much broader range of  intraregional economic transactions, from 
1985 to 1992, that the Union became anything like an effectively unified mar- 
ket or zone of production. The Union identified over 280 physical, technical, 
and fiscal barriers to transactions across the borders of its members in  1985 
and abolished at once over 90 percent of them at the beginning of  1993 so as 
to create a single European market. Because of  the vast diversity among its 
members,  APEC may not be able to implement immediately a program of facil- 
itation as ambitious as the European Union’s, but Asia Pacific governments can 
plan for such comprehensive facilitation and liberalization from the outset, 
while avoiding the creation of a regional bureaucracy. 
To ensure that attention is paid to all significant impediments to international 
economic transactions, simultaneous efforts will be needed to (1) understand 
the relative importance of  all impediments to international economic transac- 
tions; (2)  develop policy options that could reduce or, wherever feasible, elimi- 
nate these impediments; and (3) agree on timetables for taking these actions. 
There is an urgent need to build on APEC’s ongoing work to improve data 
on regional economic transactions and on the nature and cost of  all nontariff 
obstacles to trade  and  investment. The study of  impediments to trade and 
investment, carried out by  the Trade Policy Forum of  the Pacific Economic 
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ful first step (PECC 1995). It could be followed up by a more comprehensive 
effort to sample the views of the private sector involved in intraregional com- 
merce. 
The key to sustaining the momentum of APEC as a voluntary form of  re- 
gional cooperation is to establish consensus on proposals for facilitation that 
will result in gains to all economies that choose to implement them. Through 
such consensus building, APEC governments have already adopted a nonbind- 
ing set of investment principles, as recommended by the seventh Trade Policy 
Forum of PECC in 1993. There is scope for building on this positive experi- 
ence, by addressing important new areas that influence economic transactions 
among APEC members, including competition and environmental policies. 
APEC governments could also develop agreed-upon approaches to disman- 
tling  impediments to  a gradually broader range of  international economic 
transactions. 
Such a process of facilitation could be accelerated by the clearer definition 
of specific, operational objectives that need to be achieved in order to realize 
the vision of  an effectively integrated and outward-looking economic region 
in the Asia Pacific. It should be possible to set operational, medium-term ob- 
jectives for all aspects of trade and investment facilitation as well as for liberal- 
ization. With imagination, meaningful targets and action plans can be devised 
for the progressive dismantling of most impediments to most international eco- 
nomic transactions. Examples of  ambitious medium-term objectives that are 







.  . 
. 
International investment. National treatment of  all firms; harmonization of 
fiscal incentives toward international investment; 
Trade in services. Full rights of establishment and no limits on travel related 
to the provision of services; 
Dispute settlement. An APEC code of practice to settle policy- or investment- 
related disputes, based on existing multilateral mechanisms; 
Competiiion policy. Following the adoption of  regionwide minimum stan- 
dards for competition policy, no antidumping actions among APEC partici- 
pants; 
Administrative procedures. Full compatibility of  customs data and proce- 
dures; 
Transport. An efficient and safe transportation system with minimum restric- 
tion on arrival; 
Telecommunications. Mutual recognition of all relevant technical standards 
and national treatment for access to local telecommunications networks; 
Tourism. “Smart card” passports and visa-free short-term travel; 
Professional  qualijications.  Procedures  for  APEC-wide  accreditation of 
courses or tests of competence; 
Other standards. A program of mutual recognition and harmonization com- 
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These examples illustrate the relative importance of facilitation as a comple- 
ment to trade liberalization with potential for very significant net gains to all 
economies involved. Setting and meeting such targets will require considerable 
political leadership, and some of  the targets can only be achieved over the 
medium term. But to realize the vision of free and open trade and investment 
in the Asia Pacific region, all of these challenges need to be met no later than 
2010 or 2020. 
As in the case of the initial nonbinding investment principle, early progress 
is likely to involve the  gradual convergence of  policies with  GATT/WTO- 
consistent guiding principles such as transparency, nondiscrimination, and na- 
tional treatment. In all cases, successful implementation will require consider- 
able technical cooperation, to allow the sharing of  information, technology, 
and expertise among APEC members, as discussed further in the next section. 
8.6  Cooperation Programs 
Cooperation has been an integral part of regional economic integration in 
reality, although in textbook explanations such integration is often classified 
only by  the degree of  liberalization of border measures. The European Com- 
munity started with the European Coal and Steel Community long before it 
pursued trade liberalization among its members in the 1950s. However, coop- 
eration has not yet been well incorporated into the APEC agenda. in spite of 
the endorsement of  a “balanced package” of  liberalization, facilitation, and 
cooperation in the Bogor declaration. The Bogor declaration said “develop- 
ment cooperation,” but the Senior Officials Meeting changed the term to “eco- 
nomic and technical cooperation.”  The fluctuating terminology reflects the fact 
that cooperation is yet to be conceptualized in APEC. 
Some members call for more development cooperation programs on the 
APEC agenda, while others insist that APEC is not an aid organization and 
agree only to technical cooperation. The debate has continued over the recent 
Japanese proposal, Partners for Progress (PFP), formulated along the former 
lines. Some cooperation programs are classified as “facilitation programs,” but 
they certainly aim beyond the exchange of  information and consultation for 
transparency and harmonization. They would be better called “cooperation 
programs” if they aim to implement concrete action programs. 
Cooperation programs are needed in APEC in order to fill gaps in technol- 
ogy level, managerial and administrative capability, public infrastructure, and 
so on, resulting the diversity among APEC members. Both bilateral and multi- 
lateral development cooperation programs have been implemented to resolve 
these deficiencies, and they  can be continued. However, new  elements have 
evolved in these areas, and new types of cooperation programs may be needed 
that depart from conventional development cooperation of the bilateral donor- 
recipient type. APEC could define for itself a unique role in planning and im- 
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Three types of cooperation programs are identified but they are treated dif- 
ferently in the APEC agenda. 
1. Technical assistance in training customs officials, transfemng quarantine 
and testing technology, and improving administrative procedures. 
2. Help to developing member economies in resolving bottlenecks in public 
infrastructures such as transportation, telecommunications, and utilities; hu- 
man resource development; and small and medium-sized enterprises in sup- 
porting industries, agriculture, and fishery 
3. Cooperation in  specific areas such as currency stability and financial 
flow, secure supply of energy and its efficient use, and protection against re- 
gionwide environmental pollution. 
Program  1 supplements liberalization and facilitation. Deficiency in some 
members impedes efficient implementation of  liberalization and facilitation 
programs. This is well recognized by  all members, and technical cooperation 
is being implemented in APEC. 
Program 2 has been accepted in principle but is resisted by some developed 
members. However, new elements of cooperation have evolved in the Asia Pa- 
cific region recently. The infrastructure of developing members is now recog- 
nized as an integral part of  the regionwide infrastructure, and its deficiency 
will affect all members. Private sectors and local governments can participate 
actively in  building infrastructure. Cooperation among developing members 
has increased in some industrial cooperation. Such programs can be incorpo- 
rated into APEC-wide joint undertakings. 
Program 3 was identified as an integral part of the APEC agenda in the Seoul 
declaration and a number of programs have been proposed in APEC work proj- 
ects but, though implemented, have yet to produce any visible achievements. 
They are often classified as facilitation programs, but they may  need to go 
beyond the exchange of information and consultation for transparency and har- 
monized policies, to action programs. 
APEC will review its cooperation projects in the light of  needs recently 
emerging in the region. It will also set priorities so as to concentrate APEC’s 
limited resources on fewer projects and to highlight their visible achievements. 
APEC is also urging its member governments to promote deregulation and 
policy coordination so as to encourage active private sector participation. In 
order to avoid divisions within APEC and to ensure consistency with APEC’s 
basic principle of mutual respect, it is vital that APEC support technical coop- 
eration projects in which all participants perceive mutual benefits, irrespective 
of the direction of information or technology flows. 
8.7  The Osaka Action Agenda 
The APEC Osaka meeting was  successfully concluded on  19 November 
with the adoption of  the Osaka Action Agenda (APEC 1995a). The agenda 
consists of two parts: part I for trade liberalization and facilitation and part I1 214  Ippei Yamazawa 
for economic and technical cooperation, all of which turned out to be, by  and 
large, along the lines described earlier. 
Part I of  the action agenda starts with general principles: comprehensive- 
ness,  WTO-consistency,  comparability,  nondiscrimination,  transparency, 
standstill,  simultaneous  stadcontinuous  proceddifferentiated  timetables, 
flexibility, and cooperation. It is extensive, covering 15 areas: tariffs, nontariff 
measures, services, investment, standards and conformance, customs proce- 
dures, intellectual property rights, competition policy, government procure- 
ment,  deregulation, rules  of  origin,  dispute  mediation,  mobility  of  busi- 
nesspeople, implementation of  Uruguay Round outcomes, and information 
gathering and analysis. 
Its new modality for implementing liberalization and facilitation programs 
is “concerted unilateral liberalization,” as discussed earlier. This modality has 
been regarded as unassertive by comparison with the Western approach of ne- 
gotiating (as in the GATT and WTO) a liberalization agreement that is legally 
binding so that the signatories will be punished and sanctioned if they fail to 
meet their commitments. This legalistic approach would not be accepted by 
Asian countries. On the other hand, APEC members have thus far implemented 
trade and investment liberalization unilaterally. The new modality is based on 
this past experience and calls for unilateral liberalization in a concerted manner 
within the Osaka Action Agenda. 
This is a practical way to maintain and build on the momentum for liberal- 
ization produced by  the Bogor declaration. By  contrast, any attempt to turn 
APEC to a negotiating body like the GATT or WTO would probably take sev- 
eral years. Japanese leadership should be credited for this pragmatic action 
agenda well accepted by many members, and continued Japanese initiative is 
vital to the success of this modality. If Japan proposes a substantial liberaliza- 
tion program, other members will follow with matching programs. 
With regard to time schedule, leaders and ministers agreed on the follow- 
ing procedure: 
1. Submission of  action programs of  liberalization and facilitation to the 
1996 ministerial meeting in Manila 
2. Start of action program implementation in January 1997 
3. Consultation between member governments on the content of liberaliza- 
tion and facilitation programs and regular review of progress 
In addition to this general approach, Osaka participants delivered some parts 
of  their liberalization and facilitation programs in concrete form, as “initial 
actions” (APEC 1995~).  To  have done otherwise would have risked a loss of 
credibility, as others might perceive APEC nations as constantly saying they 
would liberalize “some day.” 
Two issues remained pending until the last minute. Both concerned the gen- 
eral principles of liberalization: one was comprehensiveness versus flexibility, 
and the other was nondiscrimination. 
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and diverse circumstances in each economy, flexibility should be available in 
implementing liberalization programs,  and  special treatment should be  al- 
lowed to some sectors. This proposal met strong objection from all members 
but three, Korea, China, and Chinese Taipei. Although flexible treatment may 
be necessary when the many members of APEC implement liberalization pro- 
grams, the exclusion of some difficult sectors would mean a serious breach of 
the principle of  comprehensiveness and would downgrade the Osaka Action 
Agenda. At Bogor, APEC leaders raised a banner of trade liberalization in or- 
der to encourage their officials to implement liberalization measures. Exclu- 
sions would cut a big hole in the banner, discouraging officials who had ad- 
justed their attitude to liberalization following their leaders. At the last minute, 
the Japanese proposal was modified so that no sector would be excluded but 
flexible implementation would be allowed.  Flexibility should be confined to 
flexible treatment but not flexible coverage. 
Another pending issue was the principle of nondiscrimination to be applied 
to all members of APEC. In the United States, the Jackson-Vanik law (1975) 
requires the Congress to examine each year whether nondiscriminatory treat- 
ment should be given to products from non-market-economy countries. The 
United States has refused to apply most-favored-nation treatment to China un- 
conditionally because of China’s human rights problems and slow democrati- 
zation. China complained about the U.S. intervention in domestic affairs and 
sought unconditional application of  the nondiscrimination principle. MITI 
Minister Hashimoto mediated between the two countries, and the United States 
agreed to “endeavour to apply the principle of nondiscrimination” to China. 
Part I1 of the Osaka Action Agenda covers 13 areas of economic and techni- 
cal cooperation: human resource development, industrial science and technol- 
ogy,  small and  medium-sized enterprises, economic infrastructure, energy, 
transportation, telecommunications and information, tourism, trade and invest- 
ment data, trade promotion, marine resource conservation, fisheries, and ag- 
ricultural technology. Environmental protection is not included as an indepen- 
dent area. 
A new modality of APEC cooperation was introduced based on the Japanese 
proposal, Partners for Progress (PFP). It emphasizes a departure from the con- 
ventional modality of a distinct donor-recipient relationship. Member govern- 
ments contribute on a voluntary basis resources available to them, such as 
funds, technology, and human skills, and all gain from the cooperation pro- 
gram. Consistency with market mechanisms is emphasized, and participation 
by the private sector is encouraged. Prime Minister Murayama announced that 
Japan would commit a contribution of  10 billion yen for the promotion of PFP 
for the next several years. 
APEC has made a cautious start with technical cooperation in improving 
administrative capability in standards and conformance, intellectual property 
rights, and competition policy. These measures are indispensable for the suc- 
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upon. But technical cooperation will be extended gradually to building infra- 
structure, human resources, energy, and environmental protection. The Osaka 
Action Agenda is an important step forward, taking cooperation programs be- 
yond seminars and studies. 
8.8  APEC’s Tasks Ahead 
Member economies started forming their own voluntary liberalization pro- 
grams along the lines of the Osaka Action Agenda in preparation for the minis- 
terial meeting in Manila in November. Parts of the programs were announced 
in Osaka as “initial actions” and were included in the leaders’ statement. They 
included advanced implementation of tariff reductions committed to in Uru- 
guay Round negotiations as well as privatization of government enterprises and 
deregulation of foreign investment. It is never easy to compare the liberaliza- 
tion effects of initial actions between individual members; there were both big 
and small packages of initial actions. Nevertheless, the Osaka initial actions as 
a whole turned out to be big enough to demonstrate that APEC had reached 
the stage of action. 
However, another difficult challenge awaits. As individual member govern- 
ments implement domestic legislation in accordance with unilateral liberaliza- 
tion programs, they will face strong resistance from vested interest groups and 
officials. Strong political leadership will be needed to break through this oppo- 
sition. 
The effectiveness of the new modality of concerted unilateral liberalization 
will be tested on many occasions. Japan, as a proponent of this modality, will 
likely have to lead the way through this difficult course of implementation with 
an ambitious package of liberalization. 
On 25 November 1996, at Subic, APEC leaders adopted the Manila Action 
Plans for APEC (MAPA). MAPA can be a good first step. All APEC members 
submitted their initial actions in spite of its unilateral modality, and it has be- 
gun to be implemented, only two years after the Bogor declaration. However, 
MAPA’s  substance could be improved further. While short-, intermediate-, and 
long-term measures were suggested in each of  15 areas, only the short-term 
measures contain concrete policies with clear time frames. The intermediate- 
and long-term measures consist of stating the intent to achieve the Bogor target 
or reviewing current measures for possible amendment. Even many short-term 
measures do not show a strong enough start to achieve the Bogor target. 
With regard to tariff reduction, both the United States and Japan have agreed 
to little more than their current commitments under the Uruguay Round. Indo- 
nesia, the Philippines, China, and Chile announced big tariff reductions toward 
2000, but Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea specified no concrete figures. They 
may have been puzzled as to how much they should commit under this new 
modality of  unilateral liberalization. With regard to nontariff measures, ser- 217  Recent Developments of APEC 
vices, and investment, the current levels of impediments differ greatly between 
developed and developing members, and the latter group is by and large cau- 
tious about liberalization. The facilitation  measures, on the other hand, can 
greatly  reduce  the cost  of  doing business  in  the Asia Pacific  region,  both 
through individual and through collective actions. 
APEC leaders are aware of the lack of a strong push toward the Bogor target 
in MAPA. Their joint statement admits that MAPA needs to be improved fur- 
ther under the rolling-plan formula and that the business sector should be in- 
vited to jointly review and strengthen MAPA. 
With its basic philosophy of consensus and voluntarism, APEC cannot be a 
quick process. But both the Bogor declaration and the Osaka Action Agenda 
have shown the future direction of changes in the Asia Pacific economic order.4 
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Comment  Chia Siow Yue 
Ippei Yamazawa was a member of the APEC Eminent Persons Group (EPG), 
which has provided the intellectual input that has helped shaped the APEC 
agenda. I have the following comments on his paper and on the outcome of the 
APEC ministerial and leaders' meetings in Osaka in November 1995. 
Vision for APEC 
In the introductory part of his paper Yamazawa argues that a common vision 
of APEC seems to be lacking. However, the vision for APEC is contained in 
the first two reports of  the EPG, the basic recommendations of which have 
been  endorsed  by  the APEC  governments. At  Seattle  in  September  1993, 
APEC leaders adopted the vision of a community of Asia Pacific economies. 
At Bogor in November  1994, they  set the goal of free and open trade and 
investment in the region. The issue is not the lack of vision, but how to realisti- 
cally implement it among a large group of diverse economies and in the ab- 
sence of a legal framework and binding agreement. The progress of APEC at 
Seattle and at Bogor was beyond the expectations of most observers and APEC 
enthusiasts. Even on the eve of the Bogor summit, there was no expectation 
that APEC members would agree to the goal of free trade and investment. The 
Bogor summit marked a great leap forward with the agreement to achieve free 
trade and investment in the region by 2010 for developed economies and by 
2020 for developing economies and the adoption of  the nonbinding invest- 
ment principle. 
Rationale for APEC 
To  understand the pace of APEC and the issues facing the grouping, it is 
necessary to retrace the rationale for APEC, which is missing in the paper. The 
emergence of APEC was in response to a number of developments. First, East 
Asia and North America were concerned over the slow pace of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations and needed APEC as a bargaining chip with the European 
Union for a successful conclusion of the Round, and as an insurance and coun- 
tervailing region should the negotiations collapse. Second, East Asian coun- 
tries were concerned over the rise of  regionalism in North America and pos- 
sible U.S. withdrawal from the East Asian region. APEC would anchor U.S. 
economic and strategic interests in East Asia despite NAFTA and the Enter- 
prise for the Americas. Third, the United States on its part did not want to see 
the formation of an East Asian economic bloc with Japan as hegemon, as this 
would lock the United States out of the world's  most dynamic economic re- 
gion. Fourth, Japan and Australia pushed hard for the APEC idea, Japan need- 
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ing the US.  security presence in Asia and Australia not wanting to be excluded 
from the region should an East Asian bloc materialize. Fifth, economic cooper- 
ation, including trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, would help 
sustain the economic dynamism of the region and complement the unilateral 
liberalizations undertaken by  various APEC economies. While the Uruguay 
Round  has  been  successfully  concluded,  the  other  motivating  factors  for 
APEC remain. 
Modality of APEC 
APEC members have been groping for an appropriate modality to realize 
the vision of  an APEC community with free trade and investment. There is 
general support for the concept of open regionalism rather than the traditional 
discriminatory trading bloc or free trade area; this includes extending trade and 
investment liberalization to nonmembers, either in a lesser degree or in the 
same degree as accorded to members. However, APEC members are divided 
on whether this extension should be on an unconditional most-favored-nation 
basis or on a conditional reciprocal basis. 
Yamazawa proposes that APEC be characterized as an open economic asso- 
ciation (OEA) rather than as a trading bloc or free trade area, that is, open in 
structure and policies, economic in focus, and voluntary in regional coopera- 
tion. I support Yamazawa’s proposal on three grounds. First, in view of  the 
large membership and tremendous diversity among APEC members, particu- 
larly with respect to stage of development and level of  industrial competence, 
it would be extremely difficult to negotiate an FTA. Second, the FTA concept 
is not commonly associated with unilateral liberalization, concerted or other- 
wise, nor with the extension of the benefits of liberalization to nonmembers, 
whether on a most-favored-nation or reciprocal basis. Open regionalism is con- 
sistent with and supportive of multilateral liberalization and the GATT/WTO. 
Third, an  OEA also portrays better than a trading bloc the three pillars of 
APEC, namely, trade and investment liberalization, trade and investment facili- 
tation, and development cooperation. 
The Osaka Action Agenda 
Success at Bogor created APEC euphoria, and the Osaka summit in Novem- 
ber 1995 had to produce an action agenda, short of which APEC’s credibility 
as a regional grouping would be seriously undermined. The Osaka Action 
Agenda did provide principles and action plans and consists of two parts, one 
dealing with trade liberalization and facilitation and the other with economic 
and technical cooperation. 
The action agenda for trade and investment liberalization and facilitation 
contained guiding principles, action plans in 15 specific areas, modalities for 
implementation, and time schedules. The guiding principles are comprehen- 
siveness in coverage of sectors and impediments; WTO-consistency ;  compara- 
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of laws, regulations, and administrative procedures; commitment to standstill 
on restrictive measures; simultaneous start of action by members, with contin- 
uous process and differentiated timetables; flexibility in dealing with issues in 
view  of  the different levels of  economic development and  diverse circum- 
stances of  member economies; and economic and technical cooperation to 
support liberalization  and  facilitation. There  were  difficulties in  reaching 
consensus on the principles of comprehensiveness in coverage and on nondis- 
crimination of treatment. The action agenda would cover tariffs, nontariff mea- 
sures, services, investment, standards and conformance, customs procedures, 
intellectual property rights, competition policy, government procurement, de- 
regulation, rules of origin, dispute mediation, mobility of businesspeople, im- 
plementation of  Uruguay Round outcomes, and  information gathering and 
analysis; no agreement was reached on specific action on the environment.  The 
modalities for implementing the action plans include both concerted unilateral 
liberalization in line with guidelines and collective actions. The former is an 
“Asian approach” initiated by Japan and viewed with reservation by the United 
States. The time schedules are submission of action plans to the APEC ministe- 
rial meeting in Manila in November 1996 for implementation in January 1997. 
To  ensure that the action plans would be implemented under the principle of 
voluntarism, member countries were cajoled and persuaded to submit “initial 
actions” or down payments on liberalization and facilitation at Osaka. 
The action agenda on economic and technical cooperation covers 13 areas, 
namely, human resource development, industrial science and technology, small 
and medium-sized enterprises, economic infrastructure, energy, transportation, 
telecommunication and information, tourism, trade and investment data, trade 
promotion, marine resource conservation, fisheries, and agricultural technol- 
ogy. Notably it excludes environmental protection. By emphasizing economic 
and technical cooperation with member governments contributing on a volun- 
tary basis funds, technology, and human skills, rather than the traditional devel- 
opment assistance programs, APEC has adopted a new modality that met the 
needs of  developed countries (particularly the United States) for  securing 
greater market and investment access and the needs of many developing coun- 
tries for assistance to improve industrial competence, export capability, and 
absorptive capacity for investments and technology transfers. For a start, Japan 
announced its contribution of  10 billion yen to fund its program Partners for 
Progress. 
Implementing the Osaka Action Agenda 
The Osaka summit produced an impressive list of action plans for imple- 
mentation by APEC member economies individually and collectively. Individ- 
ual APEC  economies submitted the initial down payments at Osaka; they 
included the acceleration of Uruguay Round commitments as well as privatiza- 
tion of government enterprises and deregulation of foreign investment. Yama- 
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entire set of initial actions was big enough to show convincingly that the stage 
of action had been reached. However, there are skeptics, given the modest of- 
ferings by  the big powers. 
Member economies are expected to provide full action plans by the time of 
the Manila ministerial meeting in November 1996. It remains to be seen what 
specific actions can be achieved at the Manila meeting since the principles 
and time frames of Bogor and Osaka are only guidelines and are nonbinding. 
National governments may be expected to face strong resistance from vested 
interest groups, notwithstanding the shift in national strategies from protec- 
tionism to competitive liberalization, and strong political leadership will be 
needed. Japan and the United States will have to lead with ambitious packages 
to maintain credibility of the APEC style and process. Some contentious and 
problematic issues are noted below. 
First, the Osaka Action Agenda did not produce specific time schedules for 
trade and investment liberalization toward the 2010 and 2020 target dates. As 
the early experience in implementing the ASEAN Free Trade Area shows, set- 
ting target dates without any agreement and discipline on the starting date and 
time schedule will create political lobbies in individual member countries to 
delay implementation to the last. For APEC, how to achieve “concerted unilat- 
eral liberalization” is a challenge. The Pacific Business Forum (PBF) has rec- 
ommended clear and agreed-upon time lines, with common starting dates and 
specific actions leading to 2020, arguing that unless the groundwork is laid in 
the first four years, the APEC process could stagnate. The PBF also recom- 
mends acceleration, deepening and widening of the Uruguay Round commit- 
ments, and progress reviews to compare implementation against commitments. 
The  EPG  also  recommends  accelerating the  implementation of  Uruguay 
Round commitments with the adoption of a 50 percent acceleration rule wher- 
ever possible, and deepening and broadening the Uruguay Round commit- 
ments in the areas of antidumping, competition policy, product standards and 
testing, and investment principles. Yamazawa  advocates a sectoral approach 
rather than an  across-the-board gradual liberalization schedule in the initial 
phase. However, apart from problems of WTO compatibility and sectoral re- 
source distortions, there is the added problem of agreement on choice of  sec- 
tors among APEC’s diverse economies. For example, trade and investment lib- 
eralization in agriculture, textiles, and services would be a priority for some 
countries but politically unacceptable to others. A less contentious approach 
might be different starting dates and schedules-immediate  implementation 
for countries with low trade and investment barriers and later starting dates and 
slower progression for countries expecting higher adjustment costs. 
Second, to implement its concept of  open regionalism, APEC has yet  to 
settle the issue of  unconditional versus conditional most-favored-nation treat- 
ment. Member countries would appear to have a choice of extending unilateral 
liberalization to nonmembers either on an unconditional or on a conditional 
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Article 24 unless all APEC partners enter into a formal and binding agreement. 
Third, the APEC Nonbinding Investment Principles (NBIP) agreed upon at 
Bogor  are a much watered-down version of  the original Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council investment code proposal and  is even less ambitious 
than the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), with only 5 of the 10 
agreed-upon principles meeting or exceeding international norms. The EPG 
recommends strengthening and implementing NBIP by collective action and 
conversion into a voluntary code that members would accept as binding once 
they voluntarily agree to adopt it for their own economies. Likewise, the PBF 
recommends that NBIP be made legally enforceable and binding by incorpo- 
rating them into domestic laws no later than the year 2000 for developed coun- 
tries and 2005 for developing countries. Yamazawa seeks national treatment 
and harmonization of fiscal incentives. There is also strong pressure to intro- 
duce investment codes in the WTO and the OECD, incorporating the principles 
of  right of  establishment, national treatment, and most-favored-nation treat- 
ment. Many APEC countries do not appear to be ready to accept these prin- 
ciples. In particular, there is strong resistance to full right of establishment in 
“strategic” services. 
Finally, to create a community of Asia Pacific economies, there is a need to 
reduce the incidence of trade and investment conflicts in the region. Bilateral 
disputes between the United States and Japan and the United States and China 
have escalated in recent years. The EPG advocates an APEC dispute mediation 
service to supplement the WTO and address economic disputes not covered by 
the WTO or  other existing international arrangements. The PBF proposes 
a trade and investment ombudsman for dispute resolution for each APEC 
country. Yamazawa proposes an APEC code of  practice to settle policy- and 
investment-related  disputes,  based  on  existing  multilateral  mechanisms. 
Strong political leadership is needed for APEC to resolve these issues and pro- 
duce meaningful individual action plans at the Manila meeting. 